Empirical studies on the importance of control rights on efficiency are hindered by actual -presumably efficient-ownership patterns. Finding settings where the right owner does not own the right asset and where ownership arbitrarily changes is challenging. In this paper I aim at overcoming these problems by investigating the elimination of foreign majority ownership restrictions in Mexico. Specifically, I study the performance of affiliates of multinational corporations for which (1) ownership restrictions appeared to bind before they were lifted, and (2) parent ownership increased from minority to majority as the reform was implemented. Using detailed plant-level information, I find that multinational control leads to large improvements in total factor productivity, particularly in industries that rely on technological innovations from their parent companies. Control is also associated with higher investment -particularly in technology intensive forms of production-, and with an improvement in the skill profile of the labor force. Overall, I interpret the evidence as supportive of the property rights theory of the firm.
"Giving up 5percent is anathema to many foreign companies "
Building on the work of Coase (1937) , Williamson (1975 Williamson ( , 1979 Williamson ( , 1985 and Klein, Crawford and Alchain (1978) , Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) (hereafter GHM) show that the allocation of control rights is important in the presence of incomplete contracts. Ownership determines who has the right to use assets beyond what is stipulated in a contract -who has residual control rights-, and these rights affect surplus sharing and investment decisions.
While the seminal work of GHM has made a profound impact on the profession, there is little empirical work examining the importance of their insights on firm performance. 2 The main obstacle in testing for their ideas is the difficulty of isolating an environment in which specific investments are important, contracts are incomplete, and where ownership structures and thus investment incentives arbitrarily change.
This paper aims to fill that gap. I argue that changes in ownership experienced by a subset of Mexican affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs) provide a near ideal experimental setting for examining the importance of acquiring majority ownership -hereinafter defined as acquiring "control"-on plant performance. This setting is attractive for the following reasons:
First, Mexico recently modified its foreign ownership rules. Between 1973 and until the late 1980s Mexican regulations prohibited the entry of foreign majority-owned firms, and these restrictions were recently eliminated. 3 Ownership constraints required that, in order to launch an affiliate, multinationals had to find a Mexican partner and sell a majority interest to them.
1 Wall Street Journal (WSJ) 2/16/82 on foreign firms in Mexico. 2 Previous studies have shown the importance of transaction costs in explaining organizational form, but not their importance on performance. See for example the influential work of Monteverde and Teece (1982) , Joskow (1987) and recently, Baker and Hubbard (2003) , and Shelanski, and Klein (1995) ' survey. 3 The restrictive law was introduced in 1973. Foreign ownership constraints were reduced in 1989 and a new FDI law was approved in 1993.
Second, majority and full ownership by multinationals is pervasive around the world. In 1994, 89 percent of foreign affiliates of American MNCs were majority owned by their parent companies (Mataloni and Fahim-Nadar (1996) .) Ownership restrictions potentially forced a number of foreign affiliates into sub-optimal ownership arrangements, particularly in technologyintensive sectors. Previous studies (Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Gomes-Casseres (1989)) have shown that wholly owned status is more likely in the presence of proprietary assets and less common in labor-intensive industries (Moran (2001) ). Furthermore, recent models of international trade (Antràs (2003) and Antràs and Helpman, (2004) ) rationalize these ownership patterns using the GHM framework to explain the composition of intra-firm volumes of trade. I use these previously identified ownership patterns from this literature to guide the empirical work in this paper onto identifying industries where restrictions were more likely to be costly. 4 Third, once plants were operating, Mexican majority partners were in an ideal position to expropriate parent companies. Mexico's poor minority-shareholder protection and weak law enforcement (La Porta, López de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) ) suggest that expropriation costs faced by minority investors were potentially large. The resulting lack of incentives to enhance performance in minority ventures is consistent with previous studies that have shown that partially owned affiliates receive less training (Ramachandran (1993) ), use older technologies (Mansfield and Romero (1980) ) and export less to their parents (Stopford and Wells (1972) , Desai, Foley and Hines (2003) ), relative to wholly owned ventures. As restrictions were lifted and
MNCs acquired control of their affiliates, their incentives to exert effort, monitor operations, transfer technology, and in consequence improve plant performance, increased.
Fourth, the restrictive foreign ownership laws prevalent during the 1970s and 1980s were not retroactive, which left pre-existing majority owned investments by foreign firms unaffected.
Thus the empirical work of this paper can compare the performance of affiliates that experience a change in control to (i) themselves before such transitions, (ii) to locally owned firms, and (iii) more importantly, to affiliates of multinational corporations that entered the local market before the restrictive law was implemented. These counterfactuals allow me to control for concurrent structural reforms experienced in Mexico during the sample period, such as macroeconomic stabilization, the introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or the large currency depreciation of 1994-1995 that might have affected firms with foreign ownership in a differential way (Desai, Foley and Forbes (2004) ).
I document the impact of foreign ownership on the performance of a large panel of
Mexican manufacturing plants using total factor productivity (TFP) as measure of plant performance. I examine plant TFP relative to the average productivity in a given two-digit industry and year. As described above, looking at relative ranks instead of productivity levels is particularly pertinent in Mexico.
Consistent with previous studies (Aitken and Harrison (1999) ), I find that foreign ownership is positively correlated with plant productivity. I further examine the importance of acquiring control and show that in Mexico, productivity gains derived from foreign ownership are concentrated in plants where MNCs acquire majority to full ownership interests.
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Transactions where the ownership of multinationals crossed beyond 50 percent were classified into two groups: those already associated to MNCs through minority arrangements during the period of restrictions to foreign majority ownership, and unrelated acquisitions. The bulk of the empirical work focuses on the former group since productivity gains of plants with no pre-existing multinational shareholdings may reflect initial access to proprietary assets, economies of scale, etc. (Caves (1996) ) that distinguishes MNCs but not the importance of residual control rights. The evidence, however, does indicates that plants with initial access to multinationals do improve their performance.
Ownership patterns for plants in which MNCs shift from minority to majority shareholdings suggest that parent companies were effectively constrained by the law. Before acquisitions, 93 out of 121 target plants had minority ownership in the 40-49.9 range and 54 plants had ownership levels between 48-49.9 percent. Interestingly, after these restrictions were eliminated, 97 of these 121 affiliates moved to 100 percent foreign ownership. Moving to full parent ownership might be indicative of significant expropriation costs. In lieu of poor minority rights, the value of a share for a domestic partner falls when control shifts to foreigners. Thus local investors would prefer to sell their entire stockholdings as part of the control package.
Plants where multinational ownership increased from minority to majority experienced economically large and statistically significant gains in productivity. Relative to their industry peers TFP increased by 7.2 percentage points around these ownership changes. The estimates suggest that under multinational control, these plants produced 8.5 percent more output per unit of inputs than competitors. To examine whether these findings reflect MNCs' increased incentives to invest, I further divide acquisitions by pre-existing industry characteristics to capture affiliates' dependency on the parent. According to GHM, the associated efficiency gains from having the right owner are a function of the relative importance of investment decisions of alternative owners. I use two categorical variables to proxy for dependency on the parent, based on whether a plant belongs to an industry with above-average: (1) imports of machinery and equipment to total investment, and alternatively (2) technology transfer payments to total expenses, both at the two-digit industry level. 6 Industry-wide indicator variables are used in order to prevent sorting by plant-level variables that might be correlated to changes in performance.
My main findings are four:
First, minority ventures that are acquired by parent companies are typically in technology-intensive sectors. This is consistent with pre-existing work that argued for gains from integration are associated to firms' asset specificity (Williamson (1975 (Williamson ( , 1979 (Williamson ( , 1985 , Klein, Crawford and Alchain (1978) , Grossman and Hart (1986) , Monteverde and Teece (1982), Joskow (1987) , Gatignon and Anderson (1988) and Gomes-Casseres (1989) , among others).
Second, before acquisitions, plants in technology-intensive sectors performed similarly to average plants in their industries, but under-performed same industry plants with 100 percent parent ownership throughout the sample period (affiliates that pre-existed the 1973 foreign ownership Law).
Third, after control changes technology intensive plants significantly improved their performance both in comparison to locally-owned plants and to wholly-owned subsidiaries of
MNCs. Relative to the average plant in their industry and after the change in control, formerly minority-owned plants produced 10 percent more output per unit of inputs than other plants.
Moreover, under-performance relative to pre-existing wholly owned affiliates quickly disappears.
These findings are summarized in Figure 1 .
Fourth, upon acquisitions, plants observe a significant increase in total investments, in investments in imported machinery and equipment, in the use of automatic and computerized equipment, as well as a significant improvement in the skill profile of the production-worker pool, which is consistent with higher involvement by parent companies and with increased specific investments.
The above-described results could be argued to be alternatively explained by a selection story where multinationals only acquire those plants with superior ex-ante expected performance, which would occur if, for example, MNCs had an informational advantage. 7 Yet a competing selection hypothesis should account for the above described findings. First, gains in productivity are not observed across the board but in sectors where the role of multinationals was expected to be important ex-ante. Second, productivity gains occur only where foreign ownership crosses the 50 percent ownership threshold, but not otherwise. Third and potentially most importantly, productivity gains by former forced minorities exceeded those of affiliates of other multinational corporations with pre-existing majority ownership in the same industry.
I address whether the estimated improvements in TFP could be explained by selection by examining the average productivity of minority plants regardless of acquisitions decisions.
Without selection, pre-reform minority owned plants as a group, should not over-perform other
firms. Yet, plants with minority foreign ownership during the period of restrictions, do show a subsequent improvement in productivity after restrictions are eliminated, which is not observed in plants with local or 100 percent multinational ownership throughout.
While alternative hypotheses, such as, superior governance by multinational corporations, initial access to proprietary assets, economies of scale, among others, could potentially explain why productivity is enhanced as plants first become associated with MNCs, these explanations alone cannot explain why acquiring control relative to holding a minority interest with a contract should affect performance.
7 Previous work has not found robust support to the idea that foreign acquirers are associated to productivity gains (Rajan, Volpin and Zingales (2000) ). Yet, evidence from the U.S. market for corporate assets does suggest that asset sales tend to improve productivity when acquirers' productivity exceeds the target's (Maksimovic and Phillips (2001)).
The overall findings of this paper are consistent with the transaction costs literature, and in particular, with the property rights theory of the firm. The result that not only integration matters for productivity but integration around a specific owner who contributes key specific resources, suggests that investment incentives as highlighted by GHM might be crucial for performance. 8 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes changes in the regulatory regime for foreign ownership in Mexico and aggregate trends in foreign direct investment (FDI). Section II describes the data. Section III the methods of analysis and the empirical predictions. Section IV describes the results, and Section V concludes.
I. Foreign Ownership and Investment in Mexico: Regulation and Aggregate Trends
Mexico has had a love-hate relationship with foreign ownership and investment. 9 During the late 19 th century, foreign investment played an important role in developing basic petroleum, railroad, and mining industries. Yet post-revolutionary Mexican governments pushed a "nationalistic" economic model, in which "strategic" sectors of the economy were to reside in the hands of the Mexican government or Mexican nationals. As a consequence, railroad, and more significantly petroleum companies with foreign participation were nationalized in 1937 and 1938, respectively.
The nationalistic project was reinforced by an array of policies between 1940 and 1973.
In 1944, a Presidential Decree gave discretion to the government to require 51 percent Mexican ownership in any existing company operating in Mexico. In 1959, electric companies with foreign ownership were nationalized. Furthermore, during the 1950s and 1960s, the government was actively promoting Mexican-owned firms through the tax system (Ortiz-Mena (1998) .) lead to a significant increase in the flows of foreign investment. Aggregate data suggest an increased role of foreign investment in the Mexican economy in response to falling FDI restrictions and increased stability and openness of the Mexican economy. In the following section I will describe the microeconomic data used in this paper and the methods of analysis implemented to evaluate the impact of changing foreign ownership on plant performance.
II. Data
The data in this study are from the Mexican Annual Industrial Survey ( unbalanced panel. 15 Third, inclusion into the sample after 1993 was rarely done, but there was significant exit out of the sample.
The main advantages of the MAIS survey are three. First, it is mandatory and INEGI reports excellent levels of compliance. Second, it is not shared with tax authorities, so it minimizes incentives to misreport information. Third, it provides a detailed account of plants'
production decisions.
Identifying ownership data involved merging several databases because ownership information is not part of the regular MAIS survey. Ownership data were constructed combining information from (1) Table II we observe substantial foreign ownership (average 24 percent) with relatively low export activity (8.7 percent.) Conversely, industries like industry lumber and furniture (code 33) or textiles and footwear (code 32) have significant export ratios (10.6 percent and 9.2 percent respectively) with low foreign ownership (2.4 percent and 3.4 percent respectively).
Summary Statistics
Given that the restrictions to foreign ownership were phased out in steps, first with the Consistent with Ramachandran (1993) , Table II suggests that plants with no change in foreign ownership control (typically 100 percent owned) received higher technology transfers than firms that were not majority controlled throughout (Column III) or had no foreign involvement (Column I). Technology transfers for the first group accounted for 2 percent of total expenses, while it was equivalent to 1.5 percent for those plants where multinationals eventually acquired control and only 0.4 percent for plants with no foreign ownership.
III. Methodology and Empirical Predictions

III. A. Methodology
The measure of performance I use in this paper is plant total factor productivity (TFP).
To obtain this metric, I estimate a standard log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function for each two-digit industry and year:
where i represents plants, j represents industries and t represents time. Plant TFP is the estimated residual from these regressions, and it represents the relative productivity rank of a given plant in its industry. Given that equation (1) includes a constant for each industry and year, TFP does not capture aggregate industry trends, but the idiosyncratic part of plant productivity. This is extremely important in Mexico, where structural reforms (privatization, reduction in tariffs, and macroeconomic stabilization) were significant during the sample period.
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Using data from the MAIS I construct as closely as possible the variables needed to estimate (1). 18 Although Y above is real output, I can only construct nominal output with the data at hand. Output is the value of goods produced, adjusted using industry price deflators from INEGI.
19 Starting using nominal output to compute quantities is potentially problematic because estimated residuals will reflect price and efficiency variations. If all plants were to receive the same price for their products then estimated residuals using nominal variables do reflect productivity ranks. While potentially this is a strong assumption when comparing plants owned by foreign versus local investors, the assumption that relative price differentials do not change in time is less strong, and that is what I implicitly assume in the empirical work.
As proxy for L , I use total labor hours as reported in the survey. 20 The capital stock K was generated using the perpetual inventory formula using initial book values of capital and annual investment information to update value, less a linear rate of depreciation, which I assume is five percent per year. The values for M are expenses for inputs and energy used by the plant as reported in the MAIS. 17 For an analysis on the impact of trade liberalization on Mexican productivity, see López-Cordova (2002.) 18 In constructing these measures I follow Lichtenberg (1992) and Schoar (2002) , who use the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), the U.S. counterpart to the MAIS, to (1) construct TFP measures and (2) test the impact of changes in ownership on plant performance. 19 INEGI requires plants to report the value of goods produced (at market prices) regardless of whether these products were sold. Using sales as dependent variable does not affect the results. 20 Using total wage bill instead to total hours does not affect the results. The data does not divide workers by production and managerial workers.
III. B. Predictions
With estimated TFP at hand I use the insight of GHM to test the following predictions:
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Prediction 1: The impact of foreign ownership on productivity should be stronger for majority owned affiliates Prediction 1 states that crossing the 50 percent ownership line should be associated to a more than proportional increase in productivity relative to similar increases in foreign ownership that do not result in majority ownership. Majority is extremely important because it confers the transfer of residual control rights. Majority ownership is likely to be associated to a large increase in decision rights relative to a 49 percent interests. Technological improvements by a minority foreign investor, for example, could be subject to expropriation by Mexican majority partners. As indicated before, there is evidence that MNCs provide less training and use older technologies in minority ventures. Changes in foreign ownership short of majority ownership should have a lower impact on performance relative to cases in which the change in foreign ownership translates into a majority interest. Likewise, increases in foreign ownership once a MNC has control should be relatively unimportant because the MNC already has acquired the residual control rights associated with the plant's assets.
Yet, even if this prediction obtains empirical support, one should be careful in interpreting observed changes in performance because productivity improvements of plants with no pre-existing MNC shareholdings might reflect initial access to MNCs and not the importance of obtaining residual control.
Prediction 2: Plants with pre-existing minority investments by multinationals during the period of foreign majority restrictions that were subsequently acquired by their parents as restrictions were eliminated, should improve performance.
The question that this prediction seeks to assess is whether MNC control is optimal relative to a minority shareholding with a contract. If feasible contracts are incomplete, and if MNC ownership were optimal ex-ante, as one would expect for the average affiliate given the pervasiveness of wholly owned subsidiaries, then we should expect that when MNCs increase their shareholding from minority to majority ownership (MNCs acquire control), plant productivity should increase. This is a closer test of GHM because one can isolate a change in ownership structures and thus investment incentives as the result of changing regulation. The test focuses on within-plant variation in TFP relative to average productivity in a given industry.
Failing to find an effect would not imply that the property rights view of the firm could necessarily be rejected. Expropriation costs could be prohibitive in the sense that they can prevent entry altogether and in consequence, observed plants would not be representative of those ventures where multinational control is most important, which suggests that the estimated results might underestimate the true effect of control. I examine changes in reported investment at the plant level, both total investment and investment in imported machinery and equipment, and their potential impact on actual production processes. While estimated productivity could reflect changes in transfer pricing at the plant level, finding real changes driven by incremental investments or technology adoption should ameliorate this alternative interpretation.
Beyond investment levels in monetary values, I test for changes in (a) production processes -towards higher intensity in the use of modern technologies, such as computerized and automatic equipments and away from manual tools and machines-and, (b) in the skill profile of the labor force -the share of unskilled workers relative to the total plant level workers-, which would be consistent with higher levels of human capital at the plant level.
Prediction 5: Regardless of acquisition decisions, average plant productivity for the group of plants that had foreign minority-owned investments pre-liberalization, should increase, after foreign ownership restrictions were eliminated.
Focusing on the performance of the group of plants that is actually acquired by their parents is potentially problematic because MNCs select which plants they acquire. To the extent that MNCs have superior information on the future business prospects of plants, the identified gains might be spurious. Finding an average gain in the pre-liberalization minority ownership group without conditioning on future information is a stronger test to the insights of the property rights theory of the firm.
IV. Results
IV. A. Foreign Ownership: Basic Results
The impact of foreign ownership on Mexican manufacturing plants is initially explored in Table V . Column I investigates if firms with foreign investment have higher output levels, regardless of input use. Ordinary least squares estimates indicate that plants with foreign investment have higher output per plant than other entities. The estimated coefficient indicates that, on average, plants moving from 0 to 100 percent foreign ownership would produce 1.6 times more than before. Once we control for fixed effects, the estimated increase from moving from 0 to 100 percent foreign ownership implies an increase in output of 30 percent. The decline in the estimates suggests that foreign investments tend to be allocated to productive ventures, but once we control for fixed effects, the incremental effect of foreign ownership is significantly lower.
Column III tests for whether the impact of foreign ownership on affiliates is particularly strong as Higher output does not necessarily imply superior performance. In controlling for input use as described in equation (1), it is important to keep in mind that TFP here is a relative rank within a two-digit industry for a given year. By construction, an average plant in an industry has a residual in equation (1) equal to zero, and the residual is positive (negative) for above (below) average plants.
Column IV in Table V shows that foreign ownership and TFP are positively correlated at the plant level. The estimated coefficient indicates that a plant with no foreign ownership that becomes wholly owned by a MNC would increase output by 14.8 percent relative to other local plants, using the same inputs. This estimated coefficient is very similar in magnitude to existing panel data studies (Aitken and Harrison (1999) .)
To address the reverse interpretation that foreign ownership flows into relative productive plants, Column V presents estimates when plant-level fixed-effects are introduced. Results indicate that changes in foreign ownership from 0 to 100 percent would still increase output per level of inputs, but by a lower amount, or 4.1 percent, an increment statistically significantly different from zero at the one-percent level.
The results in Column VI, address whether the impact of foreign ownership on productivity is concentrated in plants where MNCs acquire majority control (Prediction 1).
Interestingly, the positive impact of increasing foreign ownership on productivity, when foreign participation does not cross the majority threshold, disappears. In contrast, when foreign ownership does cross the majority ownership threshold the impact on productivity is economically substantial and statistically significantly different from zero. Foreign ownership, then, improves TFP, but only when foreign investors acquire majority control. Plants for which multinationals acquire control produce 5.6 percent more output per level of inputs than other firms in their industry benchmark.
IV.B. Acquisitions by Multinational Corporations (MNC)
Ownership Patterns I now turn to cases in which MNCs acquired majority ownership. Clustering close to the legal restriction to majority ownership suggests that potentially these plants were not established with an optimal ownership level but rather that MNCs entered the Mexican market with a constrained ownership arrangement. As the MNC acquired majority ownership, 97 out of 121 plants became 95-100 owned by the parent company and 87 of them became wholly owned subsidiaries.
These patterns in ownership are consistent with substantial fear of expropriation. Under weak minority rights and enforcement, majority can translate into more than pro-rated cash flow rights. Thus majority investors that sell their controlling stake to MNCs have little incentive to keep a small stake thereafter: the value of holding a minority interest is negligible once they give up control. Furthermore, MNCs do seem to prefer wholly owned status as a means for controlling their affiliates (Mataloni and Fahim-Nadar (1996) .)
Changes in Total Factor Productivity Table VII Marksimovic and Phillips (2001) find that target plants acquired by firms that add assets to their main business divisions -the closest comparable group to firms in this sample-experience productivity gains in the 0.062 to 0.14 range.
As in Table VI To test if control matters, the analysis concentrates on affiliates for which multinational ownership increased from minority to majority. Under comprehensive contracting, these affiliates should be able to have access to MNCs' proprietary assets regardless of the parent minority or majority ownership stake in a plant.
Somewhat surprising, plant productivity for pre-existing affiliates was on average, not statistically different from average productivity in the respective industries before these plants became majority owned by parent multinationals. Interestingly and consistent with the incentiveexpropriation hypothesis, once MNCs established majority ownership, target plants produce 10 percent more output per level of inputs than their industry-year peers. Relative plant productivity increases by 7.4 percentage points, a difference that is statistically significantly different from zero at the one-percent level. These results provide support to Prediction 2.
In interpreting these findings it is important to highlight that estimates of TFP already control for industry-wide yearly shocks. The specification includes industry-year constant, which should control for differential industry-wide shocks resulting from structural reforms during the sample period as discussed in Section III.
IV.C. The Importance of MNCs in their Affiliates
As explained in Section III, the gains from having MNC control should be a function of the importance of MNC' investment decisions relative to local partners. Panel B in Table VII divides plants by whether they belong to an industry with relatively high dependency on imports of machinery and equipment compared to the entire Mexican manufacturing sector. Overall, the results provide support to Prediction 3. Fourth, pre-acquisition "excess-TFP" in for technology-intensive plants relative to average wholly owned subsidiaries, is negative and significantly significant, but this gap disappears after MNCs acquired control. Panel C in Table VII shows that on average wholly owned subsidiaries produced 9.4 percent more output per unit of inputs than target companies, yet after multinational' ownership increases, the gap goes is no longer statistically significantly different from zero. Results while sorting by the alternative proxy for dependency on the parent company do not change the interpretations above. Thus far, the evidence indicates that multinational control improves productivity in technology-intensive sectors. However, estimated TFP could be manipulated by parent companies, who could use transfer pricing in a way not captured by the empirical analysis as described herein. It is therefore important to show that real changes do occur. Failing to find meaningful changes in investment decisions, production processes or in the labor force might cast doubt on the idea that MNCs become more involved in their affiliates once they acquire control.
Total Investment and Direct Imports of Machinery and Equipment
Panel A in Table IX presents I also examine for changes in direct imports of machinery and technology, which are likely to be the main channel for transferring physical resources and technology from the parent to an affiliate. The data provide statistical support to the idea that parents' willingness to share assets increases upon acquiring majority. Direct imports of machinery and equipment increase from an average of 2.7 million per year (3.5 m for technologically dependent industries) to 7.9 million per year (10.7 m for dependent affiliates), an increase of 5.2 millions (7.2 m), statistically significantly different from zero at the 5-percent level. OLS and Tobit estimates yield similar results.
Production Equipment and the Skill Profile of the Labor Force
To document how parent control affects production decisions I look at the types of technologies used in the plant and at the skill characteristics of the labor force. Using data from another survey from INEGI, the Mexican Employment, Wage, Technology and Training Survey (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo, Salarios, Tecnologia y Capacitacion (ENESTYC)) implemented in 1992, 1995 and 1999, I am able to find 42 plants for which control shifted to parents as explained before and for which data from ENESTYC exists around acquisitions. Table X shows that plants moved away from manual tools and machines, and towards automatic and computerized equipment as multinationals' ownership increased to majority.
Specifically, the share of higher-end technology relative to total equipment rapidly increased from 23 to 42 percent around control changes. Computerized equipment accounted for around half of this change.
The last row in Table X reports changes in the skill profile of the labor force. The data shows that parent ownership is associated with a large decline in the relative share of unskilled workers in the total employment pool. This share falls from 39 to 27 percent of total workers, a 31 percent decline around control changes. The improvement in the skill profile of the labor force occurs with no significant changes in the number of workers or in the hours worked at the plant (not shown in Table X .) 23 Whether this change is explained by training or hiring decisions could not be established with the data at hand.
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IV.D. Are MNCs Selecting "Winners"?
The results thus far could be explained by superior information of multinational corporations. If MNCs knew which plants were likely to become increasingly productive and they were inclined to acquire these plants, then focusing on plants that switch ownership should yield by construction to an improvement in TFP.
A convincing competing selection alternative, however, should be more elaborate than that as previous findings show that (1) gains in productivity are not observed across the board but in sectors where the role of multinationals was expected to be more important, ex-ante, and (2) that increased TFP by these former forced minorities was larger than the productivity gains of other affiliates of multinational corporations that had foreign majority ownership throughout the sample period. In other words, it would have to claim that MNCs whose ventures prior to the reform were constrained in ownership had superior information relative to other multinationals operating in Mexico prior to 1973. 23 Reported differences in Table X are not explained by time-trends: plants with 100 percent foreign or domestic ownership do not show these changes (results not shown.) As before, these results are explained by plants in technology-intensive industries, which account for 33 out of the 42 plants with data. 24 ENESTYC provides data to potentially separate between these two alternatives. Yet I was not granted access the complete files of that survey.
To further address this issue, I limit the sample to those plants for which I have production information for at least two years before foreign ownership regulations were softened in 1989 and compare their performance to post 1993 productivity levels, given that the new FDI was approved in 1993. 25 If plants that in 1988 were minority-owned by their parent companies on average improve performance regardless of acquisition decisions then productivity gains are likely to be caused by their sub-optimal arrangements derived from the restrictive FDI law and not from selection. Column I in Table XI provides evidence that this is the case. On average, plants that had minority ownership in 1998 produce 3.1 percent more output per unit of inputs than their peers after foreign ownership controls are eliminated, an increase that is statistically significantly different from zero at the one-percent level.
Given that the elimination of foreign ownership constraints coincides with NAFTA and the economic crisis of 194-1995, it is important as argued before, to compare the estimated productivity gain of former minorities to the average change in TFP of plants that were wholly owned by MNCs throughout the sample period. Column II in Table XI suggests that productivity gains after 1993 are not uniform across plants affiliated to foreign parents, but are significantly higher for those plants that prior to 1988 were minority owned by multinationals. Finally, Column III compares changes in TFP to average changes in performance of plants that were owned by Mexican nationals throughout, before and after restrictions were eliminated. I find no similar gains in TFP for this alternative control group.
V. Conclusions
In this paper I study the impact of acquiring majority ownership on the performance of Mexican affiliates of multinational corporations (MNCs.) I use the elimination in foreign majority ownership restrictions as a plausible source of exogenous variation.
I find that the allocation of control does affect production decisions and production efficiency. The results show that ownership restrictions to foreign ownership harmed the production efficiency of affiliates of multinational corporations. Upon liberalization, a large fraction of minority owned affiliates became majority or wholly owned by their parent companies. Plants for which foreign ownership translated into majority or full ownership experienced economically and statistically large productivity gains. Overall, the analysis shows strong evidence that the choice of organizational form affects productivity, particularly in technology intensive industries.
The evidence suggests that government policies directed to attract technological transfers should recognize the importance of residual control rights, particularly in countries with weak legal enforcement. Governments often limit foreign ownership to promote local interests or to prevent expropriation by multinationals. While domestic majority rules do shift the balance in favor of local partners, the impact on overall welfare is uncertain. Fear from expropriation by local partners deters foreign investors from sharing their technologies or making country specific investments, which does hurt economic performance.
Overall, I interpret the evidence as supportive of the property rights theory of the firm as developed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990) . The evidence herein presented can potentially explain why eight out of ten affiliates of US multinational corporations are wholly owned by their parent companies. Yet, whether these findings can be extrapolated to other countries that do not share the Mexican institutional and economic environment is an open research question.
Figure 1
The Impact of Acquiring "Control" on Productivity in Technology Intensive Sectors
This table shows (1) the average productivity differentials of affiliates of multinational corporations relative to local same-industry plants in Mexico, sorted by foreign ownership arrangements (minority when multinationals had a minority ownership interest in the plant during the period of restrictions to foreign ownership and majority, when multinationals had a majority interest throughout the sample period), before and after the former moved to majority as foreign ownership restrictions were eliminated, (2) the difference in productivity across groups, and (3) the estimated changes in productivity across periods. Technology intensive sectors are defined as those manufacturing industries with above average imports of machinery and equipment to investment relative to the sample.
Source: authors calculations based on the estimated results reported in Table VII The dependent variables are: plant output (Columns I-III) and total factor productivity (TFP) at the twodigit industry level (Columns IV-VI). TFP is the residual from estimating a log linear Cobb-Douglas production function for each two-digit industry and year, regressing plant output (value of goods produced) on labor hours, capital stock (using the perpetual inventory method) and materials (inputs and energy used). Plant output is the natural log of output as defined above. Foreign ownership is the fraction of ownership owned by foreign investors. Foreign owner acquires majority in a plant *Acquisition is the interaction of a dummy that takes the value of one if foreign investors acquire at least 50 percent of the shareholdings in a plant and a post-acquisition period dummy. Standard errors are in parentheses
Impact of foreign ownership on Output
Impact of foreign ownership on TFP
Foreign ownership in the plant (fraction of total)
1.6364 A plant is "acquired" when ownership by a foreign multinational corporation reaches at least 50 percent. In Panel (A) acquisitions are classified into two groups: MNC Minority Interest: when MNCs had a minority ownership interest in the plant during the period of restrictions to foreign ownership, and No Pre-Acquisition Investment, otherwise. In Panel (B) acquisitions with pre-existing foreign minority investment are sorted by two measures of the relative dependence of the affiliate on the parent. "Large" imports of machinery and equipment are acquisitions of plants in two-digit industries where imports of machinery and equipment relative to industry investment are above the average of the manufacturing sector, otherwise, "Small." "Large" payments associated with technology transfers are acquisitions of plants in two-digit industries where technology transfer payments relative to industry total costs are above the average of the manufacturing sector, otherwise, "Small." The dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP) at the two-digit industry level as defined in Table V . Panel (C) calculates "excess" TFP as the difference between TFP in a plant minus average TFP of wholly-owned subsidiaries of MNC in the same industry and year. Wholly-owned subsidiaries were organizations that preceded the restrictive 1973 FDI Law, which was not retroactive. Clustered (plant) standard errors are in parentheses, and the number of plants is in brackets. The dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP) at the two-digit industry level as defined in Table IV . All plants reported had MNC minority interest during the period of restrictions to foreign majority ownership and were acquired by their parent companies as restrictions were eliminated. Post-Acquisition is a categorical variable equal to one in the post-acquisition period. "Large" imports of machinery and equipment is a dummy equal to one if the acquisition corresponded to a plant in a two-digit industry where imports of machinery and equipment relative to industry investment were above the average of the manufacturing sector. "Large" payments associated with technology transfers is a dummy that takes the value of one in industries where where technology transfer payments relative to industry total costs were above the average of the manufacturing sector. All columns present information for up-to five years around acquisitions (excluding year t), except for Column II which uses information excluding 3. In all plants, a MNC had a minority equity stake in the plant during the period of restrictions to foreign majority ownership, and obtained majority ownership after these restrictions were eliminated. These plants are classified into two groups: "Large" imports of machinery and equipment is a dummy equal to one if the acquisition corresponded to a plant in a two-digit industry where imports of machinery and equipment relative to industry investment were above the average of the manufacturing sector, otherwise "Small." Clustered (plant) standard errors are in parentheses, except for Column IV. The dependent variables are: (1) the intensity in the use of robots, computerized and automatic equipment (as opposed to manual tools and machines), (2) the intensity in the use of computerized equipment in total production equipment, and (3) the share of unskilled production workers relative to the total number of employees at the plant level. 
Table XI Changes in Productivity by Pre-Liberalization Ownership Characteristics
The dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP) at the two-digit industry level as defined in Table IV . This table splits manufacturing plants with production data for the full sample period into three groups: (1) plants with minority foreign ownership before the restrictions to foreign ownership were eased in 1989 and eventually lifted in 1993, (2) plants with 50 percent or more foreign ownership and (3) plants with 100 percent Mexican ownership. The dependent variable is total factor productivity (TFP) at the two-digit industry level as defined in Table V . After in an indicator variable equal to one after 1993, zero otherwise. Column (I) reports estimates for plants in group (1) only, Column (II) reports estimates for plants in groups (1) and (2) only and Column (III) for plants in groups (1) and (3) 
